Griffin v. Weber

[PROPERTY LAW]

In Griffin v. Weber,[1] the supreme court held that the burden of proof to reform a quitclaim deed into a security agreement is met when both parties to the transaction testify that they understood the deed’s purpose was to provide security for the transaction.[2] In 2009, Weber agreed to cosign a refinanced mortgage that Griffin wanted to take out on her property.[3] Before taking out the mortgage, Griffin executed a quitclaim deed to transfer ownership of her property from only herself to herself and Weber.[4] In 2010, Griffin wanted to refinance again, this time with her fiancé as cosigner.[5] The bank asked that Weber relinquish his interest in the property first, this dispute arose and Griffin asked the court to reform the 2009 deed into a security instrument.[6] At trial, Griffin testified that a purpose of the transaction was to provide security to Weber in case she defaulted on the mortgage.[7] Furthermore, Weber testified that the purpose of the quitclaim deed was to secure his interest in the loan in case something happened to Weber.[8] The supreme court reversed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that the parties’ testimonies provided the clear and convincing evidence necessary to show that a security was intended.[9] Reversing the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that the burden of proof to reform a quitclaim deed into a security agreement is met when both parties to the transaction testify that they understood the deed’s purpose was to provide security for the transaction.[10]

 



[1] 299 P.3d 701 (Alaska 2013).

[2] Id. at 701.

[3] Id. at 701–02.

[4] Id. at 702.

[5] Id.

[6] Id.

[7] Id. at 703.

[8] Id. at 702.

[9] Id. at 704.

[10] Id. at 701.

Griffin v. Weber

[PROPERTY LAW]

In Griffin v. Weber,[1] the supreme court held that the burden of proof to reform a quitclaim deed into a security agreement is met when both parties to the transaction testify that they understood the deed’s purpose was to provide security for the transaction.[2] In 2009, Weber agreed to cosign a refinanced mortgage that Griffin wanted to take out on her property.[3] Before taking out the mortgage, Griffin executed a quitclaim deed to transfer ownership of her property from only herself to herself and Weber.[4] In 2010, Griffin wanted to refinance again, this time with her fiancé as cosigner.[5] The bank asked that Weber relinquish his interest in the property first, this dispute arose and Griffin asked the court to reform the 2009 deed into a security instrument.[6] At trial, Griffin testified that a purpose of the transaction was to provide security to Weber in case she defaulted on the mortgage.[7] Furthermore, Weber testified that the purpose of the quitclaim deed was to secure his interest in the loan in case something happened to Weber.[8] The supreme court reversed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that the parties’ testimonies provided the clear and convincing evidence necessary to show that a security was intended.[9] Reversing the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that the burden of proof to reform a quitclaim deed into a security agreement is met when both parties to the transaction testify that they understood the deed’s purpose was to provide security for the transaction.[10]

 



[1] 299 P.3d 701 (Alaska 2013).

[2] Id. at 701.

[3] Id. at 701–02.

[4] Id. at 702.

[5] Id.

[6] Id.

[7] Id. at 703.

[8] Id. at 702.

[9] Id. at 704.

[10] Id. at 701.