Tanner v. State

In Tanner v. State,[1] the court of appeals held that an Alaska Statute,[2] governing credit for time served while subject to electronic monitoring, did not authorize credit to be awarded if a person is allowed to go grocery shopping because grocery shopping is not an implicitly authorized exception to the statute’s required restraints, and it also does not qualify as a rehabilitative activity.[3]  After serving time in prison, Tanner was placed on probation.  But when his probation was revoked, and he was subsequently released on bail, Tanner was subjected to electronic monitoring.  The terms of his contract with the monitoring company, adopted by the court, allowed Tanner to leave home for a variety of reasons, including grocery shopping.  Tanner eventually filed a motion seeking credit for the 212 days he served subject to electronic monitoring. The superior court denied his motion because the electronic monitoring agreement allowed Tanner to go grocery shopping, finding this was not sufficiently restrictive to satisfy the statutory requirements for awarding time served.  Tanner appealed arguing that because grocery shopping is an essential activity the statute should be construed to implicitly authorize it, or that in the alternative it constituted “rehabilitative activity” which is explicitly authorized by the statute.  The court of appeals affirmed the ruling of the superior court, reasoning that while it would be reasonable for the legislature to allow for occasional grocery shopping, it was not ridiculous to distinguish it from activities that the statute chose to authorize.  The court noted that unlike the statute’s other exceptions, in which a separate party would notice if the defendant failed to show up, no one would notice if the defendant did not actually go grocery shopping when he claimed to do so.  Further, the court reasoned that grocery shopping does not qualify as attending a rehabilitative activity, as grocery shopping does not normally fit into a plain understanding of “rehabilitation,” and one does not normally “attend” a grocery trip.  In affirming the superior court, the court of appeals held that an Alaska Statute, governing credit for time served while subject to electronic monitoring, did not authorize credit to be awarded if a person is allowed to go grocery shopping because grocery shopping is not an implicitly authorized exception to the statute’s required restraints, and it also does not qualify as a rehabilitative activity.

[1] No. A-12617, 2018 WL 6582291 (Alaska Ct. App. Dec. 14, 2018).

[2] Alaska Stat. § 12.55.027(d) (2018).

[3] Id. at *2–3.

Tanner v. State

In Tanner v. State,[1] the court of appeals held that an Alaska Statute,[2] governing credit for time served while subject to electronic monitoring, did not authorize credit to be awarded if a person is allowed to go grocery shopping because grocery shopping is not an implicitly authorized exception to the statute’s required restraints, and it also does not qualify as a rehabilitative activity.[3]  After serving time in prison, Tanner was placed on probation.  But when his probation was revoked, and he was subsequently released on bail, Tanner was subjected to electronic monitoring.  The terms of his contract with the monitoring company, adopted by the court, allowed Tanner to leave home for a variety of reasons, including grocery shopping.  Tanner eventually filed a motion seeking credit for the 212 days he served subject to electronic monitoring. The superior court denied his motion because the electronic monitoring agreement allowed Tanner to go grocery shopping, finding this was not sufficiently restrictive to satisfy the statutory requirements for awarding time served.  Tanner appealed arguing that because grocery shopping is an essential activity the statute should be construed to implicitly authorize it, or that in the alternative it constituted “rehabilitative activity” which is explicitly authorized by the statute.  The court of appeals affirmed the ruling of the superior court, reasoning that while it would be reasonable for the legislature to allow for occasional grocery shopping, it was not ridiculous to distinguish it from activities that the statute chose to authorize.  The court noted that unlike the statute’s other exceptions, in which a separate party would notice if the defendant failed to show up, no one would notice if the defendant did not actually go grocery shopping when he claimed to do so.  Further, the court reasoned that grocery shopping does not qualify as attending a rehabilitative activity, as grocery shopping does not normally fit into a plain understanding of “rehabilitation,” and one does not normally “attend” a grocery trip.  In affirming the superior court, the court of appeals held that an Alaska Statute, governing credit for time served while subject to electronic monitoring, did not authorize credit to be awarded if a person is allowed to go grocery shopping because grocery shopping is not an implicitly authorized exception to the statute’s required restraints, and it also does not qualify as a rehabilitative activity.

[1] No. A-12617, 2018 WL 6582291 (Alaska Ct. App. Dec. 14, 2018).

[2] Alaska Stat. § 12.55.027(d) (2018).

[3] Id. at *2–3.