In Berry v. Coulman,[1] the supreme court held that the definition of “residence of the obligor,” as that term is used in the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA), means domicile. Following a 2011 court order, Berry was required to pay child support to Coulman monthly for their daughter. After Berry filed suit requesting sole legal and physical custody of their daughter, Coulman filed a motion to modify child support. In response, Berry claimed, inter alia, that the superior court did not have jurisdiction. However, the superior court found it had jurisdiction and increased Berry’s child support payments. On appeal, Berry again raised his jurisdictional argument, claiming the superior court did not have jurisdiction because neither he nor Coulman nor their daughter lived in Alaska. In finding jurisdiction under UIFSA, the supreme court held that the definition of “residence of the obligor” means domicile. First, the supreme court noted Alaska’s general residency statute focuses on an individual’s intent to remain in the state, which is key to the concept of domicile. Second, the court found a narrow definition of residence was necessary to achieve the purpose of UIFSA, i.e. to ensure only one child support order would be valid at one time; since a person can only have one domicile, residence meant domicile. Affirming the superior court’s jurisdiction, the supreme court held that residence of obligor under UIFSA means domicile.
[1] 440 P.3d 264 (Alaska 2019).
