In Keeton v. State, the supreme court held that attorney’s fees and costs are excluded from awards of prejudgment interest in cases of eminent domain. In 2014, the Alaska Department of Transportation (DOT) sought to condemn a portion Keeton’s land for a highway-widening project. After a superior court-appointed master settled a dispute regarding the value of the parcel, the superior court awarded Keeton a final judgment of $24,740 in land value and prejudgment interest, $47,453.12 in attorney’s fees, and $32,276.50 in costs, with a post-judgment interest rate of 4.25%. On appeal, Keeton argued that his attorney’s fees and costs should be included in the determination of prejudgment interest, and that the superior court acted erroneously in awarding the 4.25% interest rate, quashing his subpoena for DOT’s attorneys’ billing records, and excluding certain activities from the attorney’s fees award. On appeal, the supreme court found that neither the plain language, context, legislative history, nor policy purpose of the eminent domain statutes, namely AS 09.55.440, support including attorney’s fees and costs in the amount finally awarded for purposes of prejudgment interest. The court found that Alaska Civil Rule 72 also reflects this interpretation. The court then found that the superior court’s awarding of post-judgment interest at the 4.25% rate was pursuant to AS 09.30.070(a) and therefore not erroneous, and that Keeton’s argument regarding the superior court’s quashing of his subpoena request was moot because the basis of the request had no bearing on the court’s analysis. Finally, the supreme court found that the superior court erroneously failed to state its reasons for not awarding Keeton’s full attorney’s fees, as is the norm. On this issue exclusively, therefore, the court remanded the case to the superior court. Affirming all but this issue, the court held primarily that attorney’s fees and costs are excluded from awards of prejudgment interest in cases of eminent domain.
 441 P.3d 933 (Alaska 2019).