Matter of Lucy G.

In Matter of Lucy G.,[1] the supreme court held that there was clear and convincing evidence that involuntary electroconvulsive therapy (“ECT”) was in catatonic patient’s best interest and that ECT was least intrusive available treatment. Lucy G., a patient diagnosed with schizophrenia, was hospitalized due to her catatonic behavior and her psychiatrist petitioned the superior court to order involuntary ECT to treat her condition. Lucy G. objected to the ECT, arguing it was not in her best interest because of possible negative side-effects and it was not the least intrusive therapy available because ECT is categorically more intrusive than psychotropic medication. The supreme court affirmed the superior court’s decision and held the court did not make an “obvious mistake” in weighing the factors to determine the ECT was the least restrictive means to protecting Lucy.

 

While the superior court’s decisions based on factual determinations is reviewed de novo, the underlying factual determinations regarding whether ECT was in Lucy’s best interests and was the least intrusive available treatment is reviewed for clear error. The superior court’s findings under the necessary tests were dispositive and those findings adequately supported the finding that the treatment was appropriately ordered. So, the supreme court held that the superior court did not clearly err in its underlying findings regarding the intrusiveness of ECT and those findings, by clear and convincing evidence, support the court’s finding that ECT is the least intrusive treatment in the patient’s best interest.

[1] 448 P.3d 868 (Alaska 2019).

Matter of Lucy G.

In Matter of Lucy G.,[1] the supreme court held that there was clear and convincing evidence that involuntary electroconvulsive therapy (“ECT”) was in catatonic patient’s best interest and that ECT was least intrusive available treatment. Lucy G., a patient diagnosed with schizophrenia, was hospitalized due to her catatonic behavior and her psychiatrist petitioned the superior court to order involuntary ECT to treat her condition. Lucy G. objected to the ECT, arguing it was not in her best interest because of possible negative side-effects and it was not the least intrusive therapy available because ECT is categorically more intrusive than psychotropic medication. The supreme court affirmed the superior court’s decision and held the court did not make an “obvious mistake” in weighing the factors to determine the ECT was the least restrictive means to protecting Lucy.

 

While the superior court’s decisions based on factual determinations is reviewed de novo, the underlying factual determinations regarding whether ECT was in Lucy’s best interests and was the least intrusive available treatment is reviewed for clear error. The superior court’s findings under the necessary tests were dispositive and those findings adequately supported the finding that the treatment was appropriately ordered. So, the supreme court held that the superior court did not clearly err in its underlying findings regarding the intrusiveness of ECT and those findings, by clear and convincing evidence, support the court’s finding that ECT is the least intrusive treatment in the patient’s best interest.

[1] 448 P.3d 868 (Alaska 2019).