In State v. Simile,[1] the court of appeals held that a court’s sentencing authority is not limited when a court revokes a defendant’s probation for a fourth or subsequent technical violation even if the State’s petition to revoke the probation contains an allegation of absconding. The State petitioned to revoke Simile’s probation based on one allegation of absconding and one allegation of a separate technical violation of probation, which was Simile’s fourth. Judges sentencing authority was limited for absconding violations of probation, but this authority was not limited in the case of a fourth or subsequent technical violation of probation. This seeming statutory conflict led the court below to rule that its sentencing authority was restricted by the limitation for sentences related to absconding violations. On appeal, the court of appeals determined that the policy underlying the statutory scheme would be defeated if a petition for revocation of probation for a fourth or subsequent technical violation was limited by the presence of an absconding violation. The court noted that absconding violations carry a higher sentence limit than that imposed on a defendant’s first, second, and third technical violation, indicating the legislature’s view that absconding is an aggravated type of technical violation. It then reasoned that the unlimited sentencing authority granted courts in cases of a defendant’s fourth technical violation could not be restricted by a sentencing limit placed on aggravated violations. The court of appeals reversed, holding that a court’s sentencing authority is not limited when a court revokes a defendant’s probation for a fourth or subsequent technical violation even if the State’s petition to revoke the probation contains an allegation of absconding.
[1] 440 P.3d 306 (Alaska Ct. App. 2019).
