Chilcote v. State

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Kate Goldberg

 

Chilcote v. State

In Chilcote v. State, 471 P.3d 599 (Alaska Ct. App. 2020), the court of appeals held that neither Virginia’s two-tiered adjudicated system, nor the failure to advise a defendant of their right to a jury trial, violates a defendant’s fundamental rights in terms negating a “prior conviction” that increases an applicable mandatory minimum sentence. (Id. at 601). Chilcote was convicted of driving under the influence (DUI) and sentenced based on an elevated mandatory minimum sentence due to a prior misdemeanor DUI conviction from Virginia. (Id. at 600–01). She appealed and argued that her Virginia conviction should not qualify as a “prior conviction” for sentencing purposes. (Id.). First, she argued that Virginia’s two-tiered adjudication system violated her due process rights under the Alaska Constitution because it permitted an increased sentence after the second-tier trial. (Id. at 601). Second, she argued that the failure by the Virginia court to advise her of her right to a jury trial violated her fundamental rights under the Alaska Constitution. (Id.). The court of appeals held that only an out-of-state conviction obtained in violation of a defendant’s “fundamental” rights under the Alaska Constitution cannot be used as a “prior conviction” to enhance a defendant’s minimum sentence on a subsequent conviction in Alaska. (Id. at 602). The only rights that have been recognized as “fundamental” in the context are the right to counsel and the right to a jury trial. (Id.) The court held that there was no plain error below in finding that the two-tiered adjudication system did not violate Chilcote’s due process rights because she did not discuss Virginia’s sentencing law in the trial court proceedings. (Id. at 603). Next, the court held that the failure to advise a defendant of their right to a jury trial does not make a guilty plea “fundamentally flawed,” and therefore should not be treated as a “fundamental” right in this context. (Id. at 604–05). Affirming the lower court’s decision, the court of appeals held that neither Virginia’s two-tiered adjudication system, nor the failure to advise a defendant of their right to a jury trial, violates a defendant’s fundamental rights in terms negating a prior conviction that increases an applicable mandatory minimum sentence. (Id. at 601).

Chilcote v. State

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Kate Goldberg

 

Chilcote v. State

In Chilcote v. State, 471 P.3d 599 (Alaska Ct. App. 2020), the court of appeals held that neither Virginia’s two-tiered adjudicated system, nor the failure to advise a defendant of their right to a jury trial, violates a defendant’s fundamental rights in terms negating a “prior conviction” that increases an applicable mandatory minimum sentence. (Id. at 601). Chilcote was convicted of driving under the influence (DUI) and sentenced based on an elevated mandatory minimum sentence due to a prior misdemeanor DUI conviction from Virginia. (Id. at 600–01). She appealed and argued that her Virginia conviction should not qualify as a “prior conviction” for sentencing purposes. (Id.). First, she argued that Virginia’s two-tiered adjudication system violated her due process rights under the Alaska Constitution because it permitted an increased sentence after the second-tier trial. (Id. at 601). Second, she argued that the failure by the Virginia court to advise her of her right to a jury trial violated her fundamental rights under the Alaska Constitution. (Id.). The court of appeals held that only an out-of-state conviction obtained in violation of a defendant’s “fundamental” rights under the Alaska Constitution cannot be used as a “prior conviction” to enhance a defendant’s minimum sentence on a subsequent conviction in Alaska. (Id. at 602). The only rights that have been recognized as “fundamental” in the context are the right to counsel and the right to a jury trial. (Id.) The court held that there was no plain error below in finding that the two-tiered adjudication system did not violate Chilcote’s due process rights because she did not discuss Virginia’s sentencing law in the trial court proceedings. (Id. at 603). Next, the court held that the failure to advise a defendant of their right to a jury trial does not make a guilty plea “fundamentally flawed,” and therefore should not be treated as a “fundamental” right in this context. (Id. at 604–05). Affirming the lower court’s decision, the court of appeals held that neither Virginia’s two-tiered adjudication system, nor the failure to advise a defendant of their right to a jury trial, violates a defendant’s fundamental rights in terms negating a prior conviction that increases an applicable mandatory minimum sentence. (Id. at 601).