In Matter of Arthur A., the supreme court held that an individual subject to involuntary commitment proceedings has an implied statutory right to self-representation, and if the individual clearly and unequivocally invokes this right—though not absolute—the superior court must hold a preliminary hearing and consider the factors outlined in McCracken v. State to determine whether self-representation should be allowed. After law enforcement brought Arthur A. to Fairbanks Memorial Hospital (FMH) following a public altercation, FMH staff found that Arthur met the criteria for involuntary hospitalization, which the superior court approved for evaluation purposes. FMH’s mental health professionals subsequently filed a petition for a 30-day involuntary commitment. The superior court held a hearing on the petition, at which Arthur expressed his desire to represent himself. Based on the petition’s allegations and the direct testimony of FMH’s treating psychiatrist, the superior court denied Arthur’s request. The hearing proceeded to collect evidence and the superior court granted the commitment petition. On appeal, the State argued that the superior court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Arthur was unfit to represent himself. The supreme court vacated the lower court’s order, however, interpreting the involuntary commitment statute as impliedly granting individuals a qualified right to self-representation that is entitled to McCracken’s procedural safeguards. The court further emphasized the need for a lower court to engage directly with the affected individual during the McCracken inquiry, noting that reliance on external evidence such as medical opinions alone is insufficient for a finding of incompetence to self-represent. Vacating the superior court’s 30-day commitment order, the supreme court held that individuals have an implied, qualified statutory right to self-representation, which, if clearly invoked by an affected individual, requires a preliminary hearing consistent with McCracken.