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Vogus v. Vogus

FAMILY LAW

Macklin Willigan

In Vogus v. Vogus, the supreme court held that when a superior court imputes income to an obligor parent, the court may base its calculation on either (1) concrete evidence of the obligor’s historical earnings—unless the obligor demonstrates that she is unable to achieve similar income—or (2) its specific findings of the obligor’s work history, qualifications, and job opportunities pursuant to Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 90.3(a)(4). A superior court modified the custody arrangement between a divorced couple, Eric and Amanda Vogus, and required Amanda to document her earnings for child support. At a hearing, Amanda presented evidence that her highest earnings to date came from two years’ experience as a massage therapist, which entailed 20 to 25 hours of work per week, at $19.00 per hour. The superior court found that Amanda was voluntarily and unreasonably underemployed, as required by Rule 90.3(a)(4), and that she could work a 40-hour week. Based on an Alaska labor statistics table, the court then imputed to Amanda a $32.52 hourly rate, which, in conjunction with the imputed 40-hour week, more than doubled Amanda’s historical annual income. On appeal, Amanda challenged the resulting child support order, arguing that evidence of her historical income did not support the superior court’s calculation. The supreme court agreed and vacated the lower court’s order, clarifying that if a court’s income imputation goes beyond what the unrebutted prima facie evidence establishes is a realistic income expectation, then the presiding court must make the specific, necessary findings articulated in Rule 90.3(a)(4) to support its calculation. If the superior court’s imputation is in harmony with the recorded evidence, then the presiding court need not make the Rule 90.3(a)(4) findings. The supreme court further explained that a superior court may not disregard evidence of historical earnings on the basis of labor statistics alone, as such reliance is arbitrary in the face of individualized evidence. Vacating the superior court’s order, the supreme court held that an income imputation must either reflect the reality of the prima facie evidence presented—if not rebutted by the obligor—or find support in the court’s specific Rule 90.3(a)(4) findings.

Vogus v. Vogus

FAMILY LAW

Macklin Willigan

In Vogus v. Vogus, the supreme court held that when a superior court imputes income to an obligor parent, the court may base its calculation on either (1) concrete evidence of the obligor’s historical earnings—unless the obligor demonstrates that she is unable to achieve similar income—or (2) its specific findings of the obligor’s work history, qualifications, and job opportunities pursuant to Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 90.3(a)(4). A superior court modified the custody arrangement between a divorced couple, Eric and Amanda Vogus, and required Amanda to document her earnings for child support. At a hearing, Amanda presented evidence that her highest earnings to date came from two years’ experience as a massage therapist, which entailed 20 to 25 hours of work per week, at $19.00 per hour. The superior court found that Amanda was voluntarily and unreasonably underemployed, as required by Rule 90.3(a)(4), and that she could work a 40-hour week. Based on an Alaska labor statistics table, the court then imputed to Amanda a $32.52 hourly rate, which, in conjunction with the imputed 40-hour week, more than doubled Amanda’s historical annual income. On appeal, Amanda challenged the resulting child support order, arguing that evidence of her historical income did not support the superior court’s calculation. The supreme court agreed and vacated the lower court’s order, clarifying that if a court’s income imputation goes beyond what the unrebutted prima facie evidence establishes is a realistic income expectation, then the presiding court must make the specific, necessary findings articulated in Rule 90.3(a)(4) to support its calculation. If the superior court’s imputation is in harmony with the recorded evidence, then the presiding court need not make the Rule 90.3(a)(4) findings. The supreme court further explained that a superior court may not disregard evidence of historical earnings on the basis of labor statistics alone, as such reliance is arbitrary in the face of individualized evidence. Vacating the superior court’s order, the supreme court held that an income imputation must either reflect the reality of the prima facie evidence presented—if not rebutted by the obligor—or find support in the court’s specific Rule 90.3(a)(4) findings.