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Gosuk v. State

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Sloane Bessey

In Gosuk v. State, 484 P.3d 130 (Alaska Ct. App. 2021), the court of appeals held that a police-citizen contact can become an investigative stop due to repeated accusatory questioning and that when the State claims a consent exception to the warrant requirement it has the burden of proving that consent was both actual and voluntary. (Id. at 135, 137). In October 2015, Gosuk was traveling by plane from Dillingham to Togiak. (Id. at 132). An Alaska state trooper approached her at the airport and asked if she was transporting alcohol into Togiak, where the sale, importation and possession of alcohol is banned. (Id. at 132–33). After repeated questioning, Gosuk allegedly consented to having her bag inspected and twenty-five bottles of alcohol were found. (Id. at 133–34). At the superior court, Gosuk’s motion to suppress all the evidence seized at the airport was denied, and she plead guilty. (Id. at 132). Gosuk appealed the superior court’s determination that no seizure had occurred and that Gosuk had consented to the search of her luggage. (Id.). The court of appeals found that the initial police-citizen contact possibly became an investigatory stop due to the repeated accusatory questioning and ordered the superior court to investigate this on remand. (Id. at 135–36). The court of appeals also found that the record was inconclusive as to whether Gosuk consented to the search and said that on remand the superior court should determine whether there was consent based on the place and tone of the interaction, the ambiguity of the trooper’s questions, the repetition of the request for consent, and Gosuk’s responses. (Id. at 136–38). The court of appeals vacated the denial of the motion to suppress and remanded, holding that a police-citizen contact can become an investigative stop due to repeated accusatory questioning and that when the State claims a consent exception to the warrant requirement it has the burden of proving that consent was both actual and voluntary. (Id. at 135, 137).

Gosuk v. State

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Sloane Bessey

In Gosuk v. State, 484 P.3d 130 (Alaska Ct. App. 2021), the court of appeals held that a police-citizen contact can become an investigative stop due to repeated accusatory questioning and that when the State claims a consent exception to the warrant requirement it has the burden of proving that consent was both actual and voluntary. (Id. at 135, 137). In October 2015, Gosuk was traveling by plane from Dillingham to Togiak. (Id. at 132). An Alaska state trooper approached her at the airport and asked if she was transporting alcohol into Togiak, where the sale, importation and possession of alcohol is banned. (Id. at 132–33). After repeated questioning, Gosuk allegedly consented to having her bag inspected and twenty-five bottles of alcohol were found. (Id. at 133–34). At the superior court, Gosuk’s motion to suppress all the evidence seized at the airport was denied, and she plead guilty. (Id. at 132). Gosuk appealed the superior court’s determination that no seizure had occurred and that Gosuk had consented to the search of her luggage. (Id.). The court of appeals found that the initial police-citizen contact possibly became an investigatory stop due to the repeated accusatory questioning and ordered the superior court to investigate this on remand. (Id. at 135–36). The court of appeals also found that the record was inconclusive as to whether Gosuk consented to the search and said that on remand the superior court should determine whether there was consent based on the place and tone of the interaction, the ambiguity of the trooper’s questions, the repetition of the request for consent, and Gosuk’s responses. (Id. at 136–38). The court of appeals vacated the denial of the motion to suppress and remanded, holding that a police-citizen contact can become an investigative stop due to repeated accusatory questioning and that when the State claims a consent exception to the warrant requirement it has the burden of proving that consent was both actual and voluntary. (Id. at 135, 137).