Luong v. Western Surety Co.

EMPLOYMENT LAW

Melissa Gustafson

In Luong v. Western Surety Co., 485 P.3d 46 (Alaska 2021), the supreme court held that under the Little Miller Act, “labor” is defined as the work that is necessary to and forwards the project secured by the payment bond, and “notice” is effective the date the notice is sent, not the date it is received. (Id. at 48). After being hired in 2014, Luong performed labor for a municipal library remodeling project which was provided a surety bond by Western Surety Co. (Id.). By April 2015, Luong was no longer receiving payments, and after a concrete pour on October 9, 2015, he ceased working on the project. (Id.). Luong sent a request by registered and certified mail to the prime contractor for $8,379.90 in back wages on January 6, 2016, 89 days after the concrete pour. (Id.). The request was received by the contractor on January 11, 2016, 94 days after the concrete pour. (Id.). During trial, the district court excluded evidence of work completed by Luong after the October 9th concrete pour, concluding that supervisory tasks are only considered “labor” if they are performed on the job site. (Id. at 49). Additionally, the district court held that Luong failed to provide adequate notice since the notice was not received within 90 days of when labor was completed. (Id.). The supreme court reversed and remanded the lower court’s decision, finding that the district court’s definitions did not comport with the statutory purpose of Alaska’s Little Miller Act, to protect people who furnish labor or material for a state public works project from the risks of nonpayment. (Id. at 52, 56). Instead, the supreme court held that under the Little Miller Act, “labor” is defined as the work that is necessary to and forwards the project secured by the payment bond, and “notice” is effective the day the notice is sent, not the date it is received. (Id. at 48).

Luong v. Western Surety Co.

EMPLOYMENT LAW

Melissa Gustafson

In Luong v. Western Surety Co., 485 P.3d 46 (Alaska 2021), the supreme court held that under the Little Miller Act, “labor” is defined as the work that is necessary to and forwards the project secured by the payment bond, and “notice” is effective the date the notice is sent, not the date it is received. (Id. at 48). After being hired in 2014, Luong performed labor for a municipal library remodeling project which was provided a surety bond by Western Surety Co. (Id.). By April 2015, Luong was no longer receiving payments, and after a concrete pour on October 9, 2015, he ceased working on the project. (Id.). Luong sent a request by registered and certified mail to the prime contractor for $8,379.90 in back wages on January 6, 2016, 89 days after the concrete pour. (Id.). The request was received by the contractor on January 11, 2016, 94 days after the concrete pour. (Id.). During trial, the district court excluded evidence of work completed by Luong after the October 9th concrete pour, concluding that supervisory tasks are only considered “labor” if they are performed on the job site. (Id. at 49). Additionally, the district court held that Luong failed to provide adequate notice since the notice was not received within 90 days of when labor was completed. (Id.). The supreme court reversed and remanded the lower court’s decision, finding that the district court’s definitions did not comport with the statutory purpose of Alaska’s Little Miller Act, to protect people who furnish labor or material for a state public works project from the risks of nonpayment. (Id. at 52, 56). Instead, the supreme court held that under the Little Miller Act, “labor” is defined as the work that is necessary to and forwards the project secured by the payment bond, and “notice” is effective the day the notice is sent, not the date it is received. (Id. at 48).