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Peterson v. Municipality of Anchorage

CRIMINAL LAW

Hannah Rogers

In Peterson v. Municipality of Anchorage, 500 P.3d 314 (Alaska Ct. App. 2021), the court of appeals held that a court cannot rely on uncharged conduct as the basis for a restitution order but can rely on that same conduct in crafting a term of imprisonment. (Id. at 325). Peterson, driving with a revoked license, was involved in a traffic accident that severely injured another driver. (Id. at 316). Peterson pleaded guilty to a single count of driving with a revoked license. (Id.). At the sentencing hearing, the Municipality did not present any formal evidence about the accident or the reasons for Peterson’s revoked license but factored the accident prominently in its decision to impose a term of one year in prison as well as restitution. (Id. at 318). Peterson appealed, arguing that the accident was not a foreseeable consequence of driving with a revoked license, and therefore the court should not take it into consideration at sentencing. (Id. at 317). The court of appeals reversed the order of restitution but affirmed the prison sentence. (Id. at 325). The court of appeals found that under the restitution statute, a defendant’s liability is limited to the proximate effects of the offense of conviction. (Id.). Therefore, the Municipality was required to show that Peterson’s criminal conduct was a “substantial factor” in bringing about the ensuing damage, not merely the but-for cause of the accident. (Id. at 321). Without a link between the losses for which restitution was ordered and Peterson’s criminal conduct, awarding restitution would penalize Peterson for conduct for which she was not convicted nor afforded the right to a trial under the sixty amendment. (Id. at 323). However, the court did not find a similar requirement for imprisonment, holding that so long as a defendant has notice and an opportunity to contest the conduct on which the court relies, a court may rely on conduct for which the defendant was acquitted in formulating an appropriate sentence. (Id. at 325). Reversing the lower court’s decision in part and affirming in part, the court of appeals held that a showing of proximate cause is required for an order of restitution but not for a prison sentence within the statutory maximum. (Id.).

 

Peterson v. Municipality of Anchorage

CRIMINAL LAW

Hannah Rogers

In Peterson v. Municipality of Anchorage, 500 P.3d 314 (Alaska Ct. App. 2021), the court of appeals held that a court cannot rely on uncharged conduct as the basis for a restitution order but can rely on that same conduct in crafting a term of imprisonment. (Id. at 325). Peterson, driving with a revoked license, was involved in a traffic accident that severely injured another driver. (Id. at 316). Peterson pleaded guilty to a single count of driving with a revoked license. (Id.). At the sentencing hearing, the Municipality did not present any formal evidence about the accident or the reasons for Peterson’s revoked license but factored the accident prominently in its decision to impose a term of one year in prison as well as restitution. (Id. at 318). Peterson appealed, arguing that the accident was not a foreseeable consequence of driving with a revoked license, and therefore the court should not take it into consideration at sentencing. (Id. at 317). The court of appeals reversed the order of restitution but affirmed the prison sentence. (Id. at 325). The court of appeals found that under the restitution statute, a defendant’s liability is limited to the proximate effects of the offense of conviction. (Id.). Therefore, the Municipality was required to show that Peterson’s criminal conduct was a “substantial factor” in bringing about the ensuing damage, not merely the but-for cause of the accident. (Id. at 321). Without a link between the losses for which restitution was ordered and Peterson’s criminal conduct, awarding restitution would penalize Peterson for conduct for which she was not convicted nor afforded the right to a trial under the sixty amendment. (Id. at 323). However, the court did not find a similar requirement for imprisonment, holding that so long as a defendant has notice and an opportunity to contest the conduct on which the court relies, a court may rely on conduct for which the defendant was acquitted in formulating an appropriate sentence. (Id. at 325). Reversing the lower court’s decision in part and affirming in part, the court of appeals held that a showing of proximate cause is required for an order of restitution but not for a prison sentence within the statutory maximum. (Id.).