CRIMINAL LAW
Adam Beyer
In Seaman v. State, 499 P.3d 1028 (Alaska Ct. App. 2021), the court of appeals held that the eligibility date for discretionary parole is not determined by deducting good time credit from the active term of imprisonment. (Id. at 1030). The case arose after an inmate serving seventy-year sentence challenged the date at which he would become eligible for discretionary parole. (Id. at 1029). Although the court had already rejected a similar argument in an unpublished opinion, he argued that a 2016 legislative amendment and Minnesota Supreme Court decision militated in favor of a different interpretation. (Id. at 1029–30). The court of appeals disagreed, observing that the plain language, legislative history, and past practice of the Department of Corrections cause problems for Seaman’s preferred reading of Alaska Stat. § 12.55.015(g), which he used to support his proposed definition of “active term of imprisonment.” (Id. at 1031–33). Moreover, the legislative amendment, which never applied to his situation, created no ambiguity because it was explicit about good time credits. (Id. at 1034–35). And the Minnesota Supreme Court decision was unpersuasive because their overall statutory sentencing schemes are structured differently, and Alaska’s statutes include a definition of “term of imprisonment” unlike the ambiguity present in Minnesota. (Id. at 1036). Affirming the decision of the superior court, the court of appeals held that the eligibility date for discretionary parole is not determined by deducting good time credit from the active term of imprisonment. (Id. at 1030).
