CRIMINAL LAW
Court of Appeals of Alaska (2022)
Sarah Couillard
In Frankson v. State, 518 P.3d 743 (Alaska Ct. App. 2022), the court of appeals held that a trial court may consider an aggravating factor based on a defendant’s prior conviction when deciding whether to reject a sentencing agreement as too lenient. (Id. at 746). Felony defendant Frankson and the State came to a plea agreement, but it was objected to as too lenient. (Id. at 747). The Alaska legislature defines two classes of aggravating factors: “non-Blakely aggravators,” which include those relating to a defendant’s prior convictions and may be proved to a judge by clear and convincing evidence, and “Blakely aggravators,” which must be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. (Id. at 751). Trial courts do not have authority to consider Blakely aggravators in deciding whether to reject a sentencing agreement as too lenient. (Id. at 754). The superior court ruled that it had the authority to consider sua sponte a non-Blakely aggravator regarding Frankson’s prior convictions in deciding whether to accept the agreement, and ultimately rejected the agreement. (Id. at 748). On a petition for interlocutory review, Frankson argued that trial courts do not have authority to consider non-Blakely aggravators when evaluating a sentencing agreement. (Id. at 748, 752). The court of appeals held that a trial court may consider a non-Blakely aggravator when deciding whether to reject a sentencing agreement as too lenient. (Id. at 746). The court reasoned that Blakely aggravators were akin to charging decisions, an executive function under the principles of separation of powers, but non-Blakely aggravators were historically treated as sentencing matters, a judicial function. (Id. at 754). Affirming the lower court’s decision, the court of appeals held that a trial court may consider an aggravating factor based on a defendant’s prior conviction when deciding whether to reject a sentencing agreement as too lenient. (Id. at 746, 755).
