Ahtna, Inc. v. State, Department of Natural Resources

PROPERTY LAW
Supreme Court of Alaska (2022)

Sarah Couillard


In Ahtna, Inc. v. State, Department of Natural Resources, 520 P.3d 131 (Alaska 2022), the supreme
court held that certain statutory rights of way were limited to uses reasonably necessary for
“highway” purposes as the word was defined in 1969. (Id. at 138, 141). Under a statute governing
construction of highways over public lands, the State claimed a 100footwide right of way
centered on a road running over land belonging to an Alaska Native corporation. (Id. at 13334).
The State claimed that the right of way included in its scope recreational activities such as boat
launching, camping, and day use. (Id. at 133). However, the superior court granted a partial
summary judgment order declaring that the statutory right of way conveyed only the right to
ingress and egress. (Id. at 135). Vacating the superior court’s grant of partial summary judgment
regarding the scope of the statutory right of way use and remanding for further proceedings, the
supreme court held that these statutory rights of way are limited to uses reasonably necessary for
and within the scope of highway purposes as the term was used when authorization for such
statutory rights of way ended in 1969. (Id. at 138, 14142). The court reasoned that “highway
purposes encompass more than mere ingress and egress, but that right of way use relying on the
statute at issue must relate to facilitating highway transportation. (Id. at 142). Vacating the superior
court’s grant of partial summary judgment regarding the scope of the relevant statutory right of
way, the supreme court held that rights of way under the statute were limited to uses reasonably
necessary for “highway” purposes as defined in 1969. (Id. at 138, 141).

Ahtna, Inc. v. State, Department of Natural Resources

PROPERTY LAW
Supreme Court of Alaska (2022)

Sarah Couillard


In Ahtna, Inc. v. State, Department of Natural Resources, 520 P.3d 131 (Alaska 2022), the supreme
court held that certain statutory rights of way were limited to uses reasonably necessary for
“highway” purposes as the word was defined in 1969. (Id. at 138, 141). Under a statute governing
construction of highways over public lands, the State claimed a 100footwide right of way
centered on a road running over land belonging to an Alaska Native corporation. (Id. at 13334).
The State claimed that the right of way included in its scope recreational activities such as boat
launching, camping, and day use. (Id. at 133). However, the superior court granted a partial
summary judgment order declaring that the statutory right of way conveyed only the right to
ingress and egress. (Id. at 135). Vacating the superior court’s grant of partial summary judgment
regarding the scope of the statutory right of way use and remanding for further proceedings, the
supreme court held that these statutory rights of way are limited to uses reasonably necessary for
and within the scope of highway purposes as the term was used when authorization for such
statutory rights of way ended in 1969. (Id. at 138, 14142). The court reasoned that “highway
purposes encompass more than mere ingress and egress, but that right of way use relying on the
statute at issue must relate to facilitating highway transportation. (Id. at 142). Vacating the superior
court’s grant of partial summary judgment regarding the scope of the relevant statutory right of
way, the supreme court held that rights of way under the statute were limited to uses reasonably
necessary for “highway” purposes as defined in 1969. (Id. at 138, 141).