Garcia v. Vitus Energy, L.L.C. (Garcia III)

TORT LAW
United States District Court, District of Alaska (2022)

Jake Sherman


In Garcia v. Vitus Energy, L.L.C., 605 F. Supp. 3d 1188 (D. Alaska 2022), the court held that a
reasonable jury could find that a principal granted an agent apparent authority by designating him
as captain of the principal’s ship. (Id. at 1217). After suffering injuries while being transported on
the skiff of a tugboat owned and operated by Vitus, a passenger sued for negligence and negligence
per se, claiming that Vitus should be held vicariously liable for the actions of its employee, the
tugboat’s captain. (Id. at 1197). The tugboat captain was driving the skiff at the time of the
accident. (Id. at 1195). He violated company policy by using the skiff for personal reasons while
transporting the passenger, who was not employed by Vitus. (Id. at 1196). Vitus moved for
summary judgment on all claims except negligence. (Id. at 1196, 1197). The court granted the
motion on all claims except for the claim of vicarious liability for negligence based on apparent
authority. (Id. at 1218). The court explained that an agent (the employee) is granted apparent
authority when the agent’s manifestations would make a third party reasonably believe he has
authority to act on behalf of the principal (the employer). (Id. at 1215). Reasoning that a reasonable
belief of authority could derive from the employee’s position and the authority reasonably
associated with it, the court found that the passenger could have reasonably concluded that the
captain had authority to transport her on the skiff due to the nature of his title as captain of the
tugboat. (Id. at 1216). Accordingly, after granting partial summary judgment in favor of Vitus, the
district court held that a principal may grant its agent apparent authority by designating him captain
of its ship. (Id. at 1217).

Garcia v. Vitus Energy, L.L.C. (Garcia III)

TORT LAW
United States District Court, District of Alaska (2022)

Jake Sherman


In Garcia v. Vitus Energy, L.L.C., 605 F. Supp. 3d 1188 (D. Alaska 2022), the court held that a
reasonable jury could find that a principal granted an agent apparent authority by designating him
as captain of the principal’s ship. (Id. at 1217). After suffering injuries while being transported on
the skiff of a tugboat owned and operated by Vitus, a passenger sued for negligence and negligence
per se, claiming that Vitus should be held vicariously liable for the actions of its employee, the
tugboat’s captain. (Id. at 1197). The tugboat captain was driving the skiff at the time of the
accident. (Id. at 1195). He violated company policy by using the skiff for personal reasons while
transporting the passenger, who was not employed by Vitus. (Id. at 1196). Vitus moved for
summary judgment on all claims except negligence. (Id. at 1196, 1197). The court granted the
motion on all claims except for the claim of vicarious liability for negligence based on apparent
authority. (Id. at 1218). The court explained that an agent (the employee) is granted apparent
authority when the agent’s manifestations would make a third party reasonably believe he has
authority to act on behalf of the principal (the employer). (Id. at 1215). Reasoning that a reasonable
belief of authority could derive from the employee’s position and the authority reasonably
associated with it, the court found that the passenger could have reasonably concluded that the
captain had authority to transport her on the skiff due to the nature of his title as captain of the
tugboat. (Id. at 1216). Accordingly, after granting partial summary judgment in favor of Vitus, the
district court held that a principal may grant its agent apparent authority by designating him captain
of its ship. (Id. at 1217).