MARITIME LAW
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit
Anighya Crocker
In Martz v. Horazdovsky, 33 F.4th 1157 (9th Cir. 2022), the court held that a federal maritime
statute of limitations constitutes a question on the merits and that a written notice of claim
sufficient to start the running of the limitations period contains three elements: the notice must (1)
be in writing, (2) clearly state that the victim intends to bring a claim or claims against the owner,
and (3) include at least one claim that is reasonably likely to be covered by the Limitation Act. (Id.
at 1161). Here, the court consolidated two cases stemming from fatal boating accidents in Alaska
and Hawaii. (Id. at 1160). Both actions were dismissed as untimely on motions for summary
judgment (Id. at 1162). On appeal, the Ninth Circuit addressed two questions: (1) whether 46
U.S.C. § 30511(a)’s statute of limitations connotes a jurisdictional inquiry and (2) whether letters
sent from the decedent’s family’s attorneys seeking information in the days after the accidents
were sufficient to commence the running of the statutory period. (Id. at 1160–1161). The court
began by analyzing the text of the statute of limitations and found that it contained no express
jurisdictional language. (Id. at 1163). Because the Supreme Court has held that a threshold
limitation on a statute’s scope should only be considered jurisdictional when the statute says so
explicitly, the court held that this statute of limitations presented a consideration on the merits of
a limitation–of–liability action. (Id.). Thus, the court should entertain a challenge to timeliness at
the summary judgement stage. (Id.). Looking again to the text of the statute, the court noted that
the statute requires a vessel owner to file a limitation–of–liability action within 6 months of written
notice of a claim. (Id. at 1164). The court held that in order to satisfy the statutorily required written
notice, a claimant must notify a vessel owner with a notice (1) in writing, (2) that clearly states
that the victim intends to bring a claim or claims against the owner, and (3) includes at least one
claim that is reasonably likely to be covered by the Limitation Act. (Id.). The court then analyzed
whether the letters from the respondents were sufficient to begin the running of the statutory
period, and found they were not. (Id. at 1167). Therefore, the court reversed and remanded after
finding that the relevant federal maritime statute of limitations constitutes a merits question and
that written notice of a claim sufficient to start the running of the limitations period contains three
elements: the notice must (1) be in writing, (2) clearly state that the victim intends to bring a claim
or claims against the owner, and (3) include at least one claim that is reasonably likely to be
covered by the Limitation Act. (Id. at 1161).
