CRIMINAL LAW
Supreme Court of Alaska (2022)
Joseph Perry
In Ray v. State, 513 P.3d 1026 (Alaska 2022), the supreme court held that a defendant who has
violated probation set out in a plea agreement does not have the right to reject further probation
and serve a sentence of active imprisonment only. (Id. at 1029). Following his arrest, Ray entered
a plea agreement calling for both a period of imprisonment and of probation. (Id.). Months later,
the state alleged that Ray violated his probation, and at the probation hearing, Ray announced his
intention to reject further probation and serve the rest of his sentence in prison. (Id.). The superior
court rejected Ray’s request, sentencing him to additional probation time. (Id.). Ray appealed,
citing a previous state supreme court decision which declared that a defendant in the same position
as Ray may elect to serve only active imprisonment. (Id.). The court of appeals did not reach a
conclusion on the case, disagreeing on how to interpret a recently passed state statute which states
that, absent a defendant and prosecutor agreement, a judge may not reduce a sentence of probation
created by a plea agreement. (Id. at 1029–30). The supreme court determined that under the new
statute, Ray did not have a right to reject further probation in favor of imprisonment. (Id. at 1043).
The Court recognized that under the case cited by Ray, a defendant previously had the right to
reject probation provided for in a plea agreement. (Id. at 1031). However, the plain language of
the new state statute abrogated this right. (Id. at 1033). The court reasoned that if a judge could not
reduce the period of probation under the statute, it would not be logical for a defendant to be able
to, even if electing for further imprisonment. (Id. at 1034). The court furthered reasoned that the
legislative history was susceptible to different interpretations, and therefore could not refute the
plain meaning analysis. (Id. at 1036). Moreover, testimony in the legislative history specifically
mentioned an intention to overturn prior precedent. (Id. at 1042–43). Ray also argued that
abolishing a defendant’s right to reject probation was an implausible legislative purpose, since a
defendant could always immediately violate their probation and be sent back to prison,
functionally rejecting their probation. (Id. at 1043). The court rejected this argument, noting that
systems of parole and probation serve a rehabilitative and reintegrative purpose, and that the
legislature could plausibly wish to ensure probation be served rather than further imprisonment.
(Id.). Therefore the supreme court held that a defendant who has violated probation set out in a
plea agreement does not have the right to reject further probation in favor of active imprisonment.
(Id.).
