CRIMINAL LAW
Supreme Court of Alaska (2022)
Anighya Crocker
In State, Department of Corrections. v. Stefano, 516 P.3d 486 (Alaska 2022), the supreme court
held that, even though being removed from electronic monitoring does not implicate the
constitutional right to rehabilitation, an inmate released on electronic monitoring has a liberty
interest protected by the due process guarantee of the Alaska constitution before being remanded
to jail. (Id. at 488). Electronic monitoring allows some inmates to serve a portion of their sentence
outside a prison while still being monitored and limited by the Department of Corrections (DOC).
(Id.). A prisoner was convicted of second–degree murder and, after serving roughly 12 years in
prison, was released to serve the rest of his sentence via electronic monitoring. (Id.). While being
electronically monitored, police responded to a domestic dispute call at the prisoner and his wife’s
apartment; police discovered additional violations of the prisoner’s electronic monitoring
conditions. (Id. at 489). For these violations, the state revoked the prisoner’s electronic monitoring
privileges and moved to send him back to jail. (Id. at 490). After losing his appeal before the DOC
administrative court, the prisoner successfully challenged the state’s decision to revoke electronic
monitoring in the district court. (Id. at 491). The DOC moved to appeal. (Id.). On appeal, the
supreme court sought to determine whether the district court had appellate jurisdiction over the
prisoner’s request for judicial review. (Id.). For the district court to have jurisdiction, the DOC’s
decision to remove the prisoner from electronic monitoring would have to implicate either (1) the
constitutional right to rehabilitation or (2) the right to liberty. (Id.). But the supreme court held that
neither precedent nor legislative history supported the view that electronic monitoring constitutes
a rehabilitative program. (Id. 491–99). However, the supreme court did hold that prisoners retain
a right to due process before the state can revoke electronic monitoring because suspension
necessarily represents a reduction in liberty. (Id. 499–505). Thus, the supreme court held that, even
though being removed from electronic monitoring does not implicate the constitutional right to
rehabilitation, an inmate released on electronic monitoring has a liberty interest protected by the
due process guarantee of the Alaska constitution before being remanded to jail. (Id. at 488).
