United States v. Spayd

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
United States District Court, District of Alaska (2022)

Scott Anderson


In United States v. Spayd, 2022 WL 4220192 (D. Alaska Sept. 13, 2022), the district court held
that an indictment sufficiently alleges an element of a crime when it applies the relevant mens rea
(state of mind) requirement to the definition of the element. (Id. at *3). Prosecutors charged Spayd,
a former nurse practitioner, with distributing and dispensing controlled substances along with other
related crimes. (Id. at *1). But following the indictment, the United States Supreme Court held that
one of the relevant provisions required that a defendant knowingly or intentionally acted in an
unauthorized manner. (Id.). As a result, Spayd moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the
indictment was flawed following the Supreme Court’s decision. (Id.). The district court held that
the indictment properly alleged that element of the crime, and the state of mind requirement,
because it applied that requirement to the definition of the element. (Id. at *3). The court assumed
that the government must allege the intentional lack of authorization because it is a key part of the
statute, despite other courts not treating it as an element. (Id. at *23). With this assumption, the
court reasoned that the indictment successfully alleged that Spayd acted intentionally and met the
regulatory definition of the unauthorized manner requirement. (Id. at *3). Further, the court noted
that the Supreme Court had limited the requirement to the regulatory definition. (Id. at *4).
Denying the motion to dismiss the indictment, the district court held that an indictment sufficiently
alleges an element of a crime when it applies the relevant mens rea (state of mind) requirement to
the definition of the element. (Id. at *3, *5).

United States v. Spayd

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
United States District Court, District of Alaska (2022)

Scott Anderson


In United States v. Spayd, 2022 WL 4220192 (D. Alaska Sept. 13, 2022), the district court held
that an indictment sufficiently alleges an element of a crime when it applies the relevant mens rea
(state of mind) requirement to the definition of the element. (Id. at *3). Prosecutors charged Spayd,
a former nurse practitioner, with distributing and dispensing controlled substances along with other
related crimes. (Id. at *1). But following the indictment, the United States Supreme Court held that
one of the relevant provisions required that a defendant knowingly or intentionally acted in an
unauthorized manner. (Id.). As a result, Spayd moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the
indictment was flawed following the Supreme Court’s decision. (Id.). The district court held that
the indictment properly alleged that element of the crime, and the state of mind requirement,
because it applied that requirement to the definition of the element. (Id. at *3). The court assumed
that the government must allege the intentional lack of authorization because it is a key part of the
statute, despite other courts not treating it as an element. (Id. at *23). With this assumption, the
court reasoned that the indictment successfully alleged that Spayd acted intentionally and met the
regulatory definition of the unauthorized manner requirement. (Id. at *3). Further, the court noted
that the Supreme Court had limited the requirement to the regulatory definition. (Id. at *4).
Denying the motion to dismiss the indictment, the district court held that an indictment sufficiently
alleges an element of a crime when it applies the relevant mens rea (state of mind) requirement to
the definition of the element. (Id. at *3, *5).