Alaska Public Defender Agency v. Superior Court

CRIMINAL JUSTICE
Court of Appeals of Alaska (2023)
Shaun Thompson

In Alaska Public Defender Agency v. Superior Court, 530 P.30 604 (Alaska Ct. App. 2023), the court of appeals held that a trial court may not toll the speedy trial clock if a defendant affirmatively objects to defense counsel’s motion for continuance. (Id. at 616). The court appointed the Alaska Public Defender Agency to represent David Ward for his charges of second-degree sexual assault and second-degree assault. (Id. at 607). After failed negotiations with the State, Ward expressed that he wanted to go to trial as soon as possible. (Id.). Ward’s attorney filed a motion to continue the trial date because the attorney was unprepared to proceed to trial, which Ward objected to. (Id.). The superior court refused to toll the speedy trial clock, determining that both the defendant and the defendant’s attorney must consent to a continuance of the trial date. (Id. at 608). The court of appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that, on its face, Alaska Criminal Rule 45(d)(2) requires both the defendant and the defendant’s attorney to consent to a motion for continuance to toll the speedy trial clock. (Id. at 616). Accordingly, a trial court may not toll the speedy trial clock if a defendant affirmatively objects to defense counsel’s request for a continuance. (Id.) The court further reasoned that, since defense counsel is presumed to make the decision to move for continuance only after consultation with the defendant, a defendant’s silence may be inferred as consent to a motion for continuance requested by defense counsel. (Id.) Affirming the lower court’s decision, the court of appeals held that a trial court may not toll the speedy trial clock if a defendant affirmatively objects to defense counsel’s motion for continuance. (Id.)

Alaska Public Defender Agency v. Superior Court

CRIMINAL JUSTICE
Court of Appeals of Alaska (2023)
Shaun Thompson

In Alaska Public Defender Agency v. Superior Court, 530 P.30 604 (Alaska Ct. App. 2023), the court of appeals held that a trial court may not toll the speedy trial clock if a defendant affirmatively objects to defense counsel’s motion for continuance. (Id. at 616). The court appointed the Alaska Public Defender Agency to represent David Ward for his charges of second-degree sexual assault and second-degree assault. (Id. at 607). After failed negotiations with the State, Ward expressed that he wanted to go to trial as soon as possible. (Id.). Ward’s attorney filed a motion to continue the trial date because the attorney was unprepared to proceed to trial, which Ward objected to. (Id.). The superior court refused to toll the speedy trial clock, determining that both the defendant and the defendant’s attorney must consent to a continuance of the trial date. (Id. at 608). The court of appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that, on its face, Alaska Criminal Rule 45(d)(2) requires both the defendant and the defendant’s attorney to consent to a motion for continuance to toll the speedy trial clock. (Id. at 616). Accordingly, a trial court may not toll the speedy trial clock if a defendant affirmatively objects to defense counsel’s request for a continuance. (Id.) The court further reasoned that, since defense counsel is presumed to make the decision to move for continuance only after consultation with the defendant, a defendant’s silence may be inferred as consent to a motion for continuance requested by defense counsel. (Id.) Affirming the lower court’s decision, the court of appeals held that a trial court may not toll the speedy trial clock if a defendant affirmatively objects to defense counsel’s motion for continuance. (Id.)