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Douglas v. State

CRIMINAL LAW
Court of Appeals of Alaska (2023)
Cindy Cheng

In Douglas v. State, 527 P.3d 291 (Alaska Ct. App. 2023), the court of appeals held that a defendant is entitled to in camera review of privileged mental health records if he shows a reasonable likelihood that the records contain exculpatory evidence that relevant to his defense, which are unavailable from less intrusive sources. (Id. at 308). John Robert Douglas was convicted following a jury trial of second-degree sexual assault for grabbing a woman’s breast in an elevator. (Id. at 295). At the time of the incident, the woman (R.D.) had a legal guardian appointed ten years earlier after R.D. suffered a traumatic brain injury from a serious car accident. (Id.). On appeal, Douglas sought in camera review of neuropsychological reports in R.D.’s guardianship file, arguing that R.D.’s traumatic brain injury might affect her ability to perceive and remember events. (Id. at 299). The court of appeals reversed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that to obtain in camera review of privileged records, most jurisdictions require a defendant to show more than just the possibility that the records might contain relevant information, but not a higher standard. (Id. at 305). Generally, defendants must show a “reasonable likelihood” that the records contain evidence that is “exculpatory” or “material information necessary to the defense.” (Id.). The court explained that this standard is intended to protect both privilege and a defendant’s constitutional rights. (Id. at 308). Moreover, the court recognized that an in camera review is less intrusive than disclosure and beneficial to future appellate review. (Id.). The court rejected a higher standard that a court should permit in camera review only under circumstances indicating necessity. (Id. at 307). The court reasoned that this higher standard applied to court-ordered psychiatric examination, which is significantly more intrusive than an in camera review of existing mental health records. (Id.). The court further reasoned that this higher standard failed to consider other types of exculpatory evidence that might exist in a victim’s mental health records. (Id.). The existence of the guardianship was evidence that R.D. might have ongoing deficits in perceiving and reporting information from the alleged assault. (Id. at 311). Reversing the lower court’s decision, the court of appeals held that a defendant is entitled to in camera review of privileged mental health records if he shows a reasonable likelihood that the records contain exculpatory evidence relevant to his defense, which are unavailable from less intrusive sources. (Id. at 308).

Douglas v. State

CRIMINAL LAW
Court of Appeals of Alaska (2023)
Cindy Cheng

In Douglas v. State, 527 P.3d 291 (Alaska Ct. App. 2023), the court of appeals held that a defendant is entitled to in camera review of privileged mental health records if he shows a reasonable likelihood that the records contain exculpatory evidence that relevant to his defense, which are unavailable from less intrusive sources. (Id. at 308). John Robert Douglas was convicted following a jury trial of second-degree sexual assault for grabbing a woman’s breast in an elevator. (Id. at 295). At the time of the incident, the woman (R.D.) had a legal guardian appointed ten years earlier after R.D. suffered a traumatic brain injury from a serious car accident. (Id.). On appeal, Douglas sought in camera review of neuropsychological reports in R.D.’s guardianship file, arguing that R.D.’s traumatic brain injury might affect her ability to perceive and remember events. (Id. at 299). The court of appeals reversed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that to obtain in camera review of privileged records, most jurisdictions require a defendant to show more than just the possibility that the records might contain relevant information, but not a higher standard. (Id. at 305). Generally, defendants must show a “reasonable likelihood” that the records contain evidence that is “exculpatory” or “material information necessary to the defense.” (Id.). The court explained that this standard is intended to protect both privilege and a defendant’s constitutional rights. (Id. at 308). Moreover, the court recognized that an in camera review is less intrusive than disclosure and beneficial to future appellate review. (Id.). The court rejected a higher standard that a court should permit in camera review only under circumstances indicating necessity. (Id. at 307). The court reasoned that this higher standard applied to court-ordered psychiatric examination, which is significantly more intrusive than an in camera review of existing mental health records. (Id.). The court further reasoned that this higher standard failed to consider other types of exculpatory evidence that might exist in a victim’s mental health records. (Id.). The existence of the guardianship was evidence that R.D. might have ongoing deficits in perceiving and reporting information from the alleged assault. (Id. at 311). Reversing the lower court’s decision, the court of appeals held that a defendant is entitled to in camera review of privileged mental health records if he shows a reasonable likelihood that the records contain exculpatory evidence relevant to his defense, which are unavailable from less intrusive sources. (Id. at 308).