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Department of Family and Community Services, Office of Children’s Services v. Lane

EMPLOYMENT LAW
Supreme Court of Alaska (2024)
Rasa Kerelis

In Department of Family and Community Services, Office of Children’s Services v. Lane 542 P.3d 1124 (Alaska 2024), the supreme court denied a post-trial motion for a new trial, vacated the superior court’s damages judgment to limit noneconomic damages calculations, and remanded for further proceedings. (Id.). Brett Lane worked as an Office of Children’s Services (OCS) caseworker in 2012 when Wilson, the father in one of her assigned cases, physically assaulted Lane. (Id. at  1130–31). Lane’s supervisors failed to file an incident report until five months after the incident, prevented Lane from contacting the police after two separate assaults, and created an unworkable environment by limiting contact with co-workers, access to casefiles, and time in the office while emphasizing an expectation of managing a full caseload. (Id. at 1131). Lane took a mixture of planned leave and unplanned leave (for which the proceedings had not yet concluded at the time of appeal) plus workers’ compensation benefits after receiving a post-traumatic stress disorder diagnosis. (Id.). Lane then quit and filed a claim of constructive discharge for which she sought damages. (Id.). This case came to the Alaska Supreme Court on appeal, where OCS motioned for a new trial contesting damages, jury instructions related to calculating damages, and the legal standard used to review the weight of evidence presented to the jury. (Id. at 1129–30).

As to the jury instructions on damages, the Alaska Supreme Court explained that for the IIED claim, the jury instructions should have treated Wilson’s physical assault and OCS’s employment-related offenses as “separate independent causes” for one incident, not for “divisible damages among multiple causal incidents.” (Id. at 1145). The court also explained that to overturn the superior court’s ruling, the evidence Lane provided must be “completely lacking” or “so slight and unconvincing as to make the verdict plainly unreasonable and unjust,” an extremely high burden only reached in “the most exceptional circumstances,” which was not the case here. (Id. at 1333). Importantly, the court also reasoned that OCS’s claim that damages should account for workers’ compensation is untenable both because a common law remedy exists for wrongful retaliatory discharge notwithstanding the worker’s compensation system (barring an exclusivity of process claim), and because the worker’s compensation case was actively ongoing at the time. (Id. at 1134). As such, the court affirmed the denial of OCS’s post-trial motion, but vacated the damages judgment and remanded for further proceedings both due to the erroneous jury instruction and to await the results of the workers’ compensation benefits proceedings so as to not duplicate damages. (Id. at 1130).

Department of Family and Community Services, Office of Children’s Services v. Lane

EMPLOYMENT LAW
Supreme Court of Alaska (2024)
Rasa Kerelis

In Department of Family and Community Services, Office of Children’s Services v. Lane 542 P.3d 1124 (Alaska 2024), the supreme court denied a post-trial motion for a new trial, vacated the superior court’s damages judgment to limit noneconomic damages calculations, and remanded for further proceedings. (Id.). Brett Lane worked as an Office of Children’s Services (OCS) caseworker in 2012 when Wilson, the father in one of her assigned cases, physically assaulted Lane. (Id. at  1130–31). Lane’s supervisors failed to file an incident report until five months after the incident, prevented Lane from contacting the police after two separate assaults, and created an unworkable environment by limiting contact with co-workers, access to casefiles, and time in the office while emphasizing an expectation of managing a full caseload. (Id. at 1131). Lane took a mixture of planned leave and unplanned leave (for which the proceedings had not yet concluded at the time of appeal) plus workers’ compensation benefits after receiving a post-traumatic stress disorder diagnosis. (Id.). Lane then quit and filed a claim of constructive discharge for which she sought damages. (Id.). This case came to the Alaska Supreme Court on appeal, where OCS motioned for a new trial contesting damages, jury instructions related to calculating damages, and the legal standard used to review the weight of evidence presented to the jury. (Id. at 1129–30).

As to the jury instructions on damages, the Alaska Supreme Court explained that for the IIED claim, the jury instructions should have treated Wilson’s physical assault and OCS’s employment-related offenses as “separate independent causes” for one incident, not for “divisible damages among multiple causal incidents.” (Id. at 1145). The court also explained that to overturn the superior court’s ruling, the evidence Lane provided must be “completely lacking” or “so slight and unconvincing as to make the verdict plainly unreasonable and unjust,” an extremely high burden only reached in “the most exceptional circumstances,” which was not the case here. (Id. at 1333). Importantly, the court also reasoned that OCS’s claim that damages should account for workers’ compensation is untenable both because a common law remedy exists for wrongful retaliatory discharge notwithstanding the worker’s compensation system (barring an exclusivity of process claim), and because the worker’s compensation case was actively ongoing at the time. (Id. at 1134). As such, the court affirmed the denial of OCS’s post-trial motion, but vacated the damages judgment and remanded for further proceedings both due to the erroneous jury instruction and to await the results of the workers’ compensation benefits proceedings so as to not duplicate damages. (Id. at 1130).