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Hank v. State

CRIMINAL LAW
Court of Appeals of Alaska (2024)
Abby Murray

In Hank v. State, the court of appeals held that a trial court may accept a mandatory stipulation to element(s) of a crime, without first obtaining the defendant’s personal waiver of the right to a jury trial on the element(s), so long as: (1) the stipulation does not effectively amount to a guilty plea, and (2) there is no indication in the record that the defendant disagrees with the decision to stipulate. Hank v. State, 551 P.3d 599, 608 (Alaska Ct. App. 2024). Tolookqaqsiiq Hank was charged with third-degree weapons misconduct (felon in possession) after he was found in bed with a pistol. (Id. at 601). Before trial, Hank stipulated to two of the three elements of felon in possession so that the jury would not hear details about his prior convictions. (Id.). The court thus instructed the jury that it “must” accept the stipulated facts as true. (Id. at 602). At no time did Hank object to this course of action. (Id.). On appeal, however, Hank argued that it was structural error for the court to instruct the jury on the mandatory stipulations before obtaining his waiver of his right to a jury trial on the two elements. (Id.). This argument rests on two assumptions. (Id. at 601, 605). First, Hank assumes that a stipulation to an element of a crime necessarily qualifies as a jury trial waiver on that element. (Id. at 601). Second, he maintains that mandatory stipulation instructions require the court to obtain a jury trial waiver. (Id. at 605). However, a defendant’s willingness to stipulate does not change the fact that the jury, and not the judge, remains the trier of fact. (Id. at 603). And case law is clear that jury waivers are only required when the judge replaces the jury as factfinder––not in the stipulation context, even if the stipulation instruction is mandatory in nature. (Id. at 605). While it can be a structural error for a trial court to take conclusive judicial notice of an element of an offense, the case at hand involved stipulated facts, as opposed to judicially noticed facts. (Id. at 605–06). Here, defendant did not object to the mandatory stipulations. (Id. at 602). Moreover, the jury remained the factfinders in his trial. (Id. at 608). Thus, the superior court was not required to obtain Hank’s jury trial waiver. (Id.).

 

Hank v. State

CRIMINAL LAW
Court of Appeals of Alaska (2024)
Abby Murray

In Hank v. State, the court of appeals held that a trial court may accept a mandatory stipulation to element(s) of a crime, without first obtaining the defendant’s personal waiver of the right to a jury trial on the element(s), so long as: (1) the stipulation does not effectively amount to a guilty plea, and (2) there is no indication in the record that the defendant disagrees with the decision to stipulate. Hank v. State, 551 P.3d 599, 608 (Alaska Ct. App. 2024). Tolookqaqsiiq Hank was charged with third-degree weapons misconduct (felon in possession) after he was found in bed with a pistol. (Id. at 601). Before trial, Hank stipulated to two of the three elements of felon in possession so that the jury would not hear details about his prior convictions. (Id.). The court thus instructed the jury that it “must” accept the stipulated facts as true. (Id. at 602). At no time did Hank object to this course of action. (Id.). On appeal, however, Hank argued that it was structural error for the court to instruct the jury on the mandatory stipulations before obtaining his waiver of his right to a jury trial on the two elements. (Id.). This argument rests on two assumptions. (Id. at 601, 605). First, Hank assumes that a stipulation to an element of a crime necessarily qualifies as a jury trial waiver on that element. (Id. at 601). Second, he maintains that mandatory stipulation instructions require the court to obtain a jury trial waiver. (Id. at 605). However, a defendant’s willingness to stipulate does not change the fact that the jury, and not the judge, remains the trier of fact. (Id. at 603). And case law is clear that jury waivers are only required when the judge replaces the jury as factfinder––not in the stipulation context, even if the stipulation instruction is mandatory in nature. (Id. at 605). While it can be a structural error for a trial court to take conclusive judicial notice of an element of an offense, the case at hand involved stipulated facts, as opposed to judicially noticed facts. (Id. at 605–06). Here, defendant did not object to the mandatory stipulations. (Id. at 602). Moreover, the jury remained the factfinders in his trial. (Id. at 608). Thus, the superior court was not required to obtain Hank’s jury trial waiver. (Id.).