FAMILY LAW
Court of Appeals of Alaska (2024)
Erik Gordon
In I.J. v. State, 553 P.3d 1263 (Alaska Ct. App. 2024), the court of appeals held that “the least restrictive alternative rule” does not mean that each less restrictive alternative must be attempted when there is sufficient evidence to suggest that the less restrictive measures will fail. (Id. at 1271). After several failed attempts to place I.J. in juvenile programs, including foster homes, I.J. was placed at a rehabilitation center where his stay was conditioned in his conduct agreement upon his abstinence from drugs and alcohol. (Id. at 1266). I.J. tested positive for prohibited substances at the center before he eventually ran away. (Id.). I.J. once more broke his conduct agreement at another center and ultimately a magistrate judge, based on I.J.’s prior conduct determined that I.J. should be subject to a (b)(1) order under AS 47.12.120 and placed at a youth center. (Id. at 1268). On appeal, I.J. argued that the (b)(1) order was inappropriate because I.J. had not been allowed to explore less restrictive alternatives than the center. (Id. at 1271). However, the court reasoned that because of the substantial evidence of I.J.’s past behavior at less restrictive housing arrangements, I.J. was not entitled to exhaust all available less restrictive arrangements. (Id. at 1271). The court noted that I.J. was a threat to himself and the community as evidence supporting their conclusion. (Id. at 1271). He was, thus, placed in the center, although the court remanded to reanalyze the two-year time span order as the court felt that it may be too long of a sentence. (Id. at 1272). Affirming in part the lower court’s decision, the court of appeals held that “the least restrictive alternative rule” does not mean that each less restrictive alternative must be attempted when there is sufficient evidence to suggest that the less restrictive measures will fail. (Id. at 1271.)
