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Middleton v. State

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Court of Appeals of Alaska (2024)
Grace Koh

In Middleton v. State, 556 P.3d 276 (Alaska App. 2024), the court of appeals held that an amendment to AS 33.16.220(i), a provision authorizing the parole board to revoke all or a portion of a defendant’s remaining parole, was not fully retroactive. (Id.). In 2006, Middleton was sentenced in two separate cases to a composite term of 4,750 days to serve. (Id. at 277). DOC calculated his mandatory parole release date as March 23, 2013, and his maximum release date as July 23, 2017. (Id.). In 2013, Middleton was released on parole, but after his release, he repeatedly violated his parole and committed a new criminal offense. (Id. 277–78). In December 2015, the Alaska Parole Board revoked Middleton’s parole, and DOC subsequently recalculated his mandatory parole date and his maximum release date. (Id. at 278). In July 2016, the Alaska legislature enacted Senate Bill 91, which amended AS 33.16.220(i) to state that the parole board “could not ‘extend the period of parole beyond the maximum release date calculated by [DOC] on the parolee’s original sentence’.” (Id.). In September 2017, the parole board again revoked Middleton’s parole and imposed a parole revocation sentence, and DOC recalculated Middleton’s mandatory parole date, while maintaining the same maximum release date from December 2015. (Id.). Middleton then applied for post-conviction relief arguing that the parole board’s 2017 action violated the 2016 amendment, but the superior court rejected Middleton’s claim. (Id.). When Middleton appealed, the State realized that DOC had recalculated Middleton’s maximum release date in December 2015 before the 2016 amendment. (Id.). The case was thus remanded to the superior court to determine whether the 2016 amendment had an impact on the parole board’s December 2015 action but was dismissed for the second time. (Id.). In his subsequent appeal, Middleton argued that the 2016 amendment was retroactive, and the December 2015 action was invalidated by its enactment. (Id.). However, beginning with the presumption against retroactive legislation, analyzing legislative history that clarified that the statutory change was not retroactive, and utilizing statutory interpretation, the court of appeals upheld the superior court’s dismissal of Middleton’s post-conviction relief application and held that the 2016 amendment was not fully retroactive. (Id. at 279).

Middleton v. State

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Court of Appeals of Alaska (2024)
Grace Koh

In Middleton v. State, 556 P.3d 276 (Alaska App. 2024), the court of appeals held that an amendment to AS 33.16.220(i), a provision authorizing the parole board to revoke all or a portion of a defendant’s remaining parole, was not fully retroactive. (Id.). In 2006, Middleton was sentenced in two separate cases to a composite term of 4,750 days to serve. (Id. at 277). DOC calculated his mandatory parole release date as March 23, 2013, and his maximum release date as July 23, 2017. (Id.). In 2013, Middleton was released on parole, but after his release, he repeatedly violated his parole and committed a new criminal offense. (Id. 277–78). In December 2015, the Alaska Parole Board revoked Middleton’s parole, and DOC subsequently recalculated his mandatory parole date and his maximum release date. (Id. at 278). In July 2016, the Alaska legislature enacted Senate Bill 91, which amended AS 33.16.220(i) to state that the parole board “could not ‘extend the period of parole beyond the maximum release date calculated by [DOC] on the parolee’s original sentence’.” (Id.). In September 2017, the parole board again revoked Middleton’s parole and imposed a parole revocation sentence, and DOC recalculated Middleton’s mandatory parole date, while maintaining the same maximum release date from December 2015. (Id.). Middleton then applied for post-conviction relief arguing that the parole board’s 2017 action violated the 2016 amendment, but the superior court rejected Middleton’s claim. (Id.). When Middleton appealed, the State realized that DOC had recalculated Middleton’s maximum release date in December 2015 before the 2016 amendment. (Id.). The case was thus remanded to the superior court to determine whether the 2016 amendment had an impact on the parole board’s December 2015 action but was dismissed for the second time. (Id.). In his subsequent appeal, Middleton argued that the 2016 amendment was retroactive, and the December 2015 action was invalidated by its enactment. (Id.). However, beginning with the presumption against retroactive legislation, analyzing legislative history that clarified that the statutory change was not retroactive, and utilizing statutory interpretation, the court of appeals upheld the superior court’s dismissal of Middleton’s post-conviction relief application and held that the 2016 amendment was not fully retroactive. (Id. at 279).