Main Menu

Collins v. State

CRIMINAL LAW
Supreme Court of Alaska (2025)
Katharine Roberts

In Collins v. State, 568 P.3d 349 (Alaska 2025), the Supreme Court of Alaska held that the Court of Appeals of Alaska erred by retroactively applying new standards dictating whether a criminal defendant’s case can be heard by a three-judge sentencing panel, violating the separation of powers doctrine and the prohibition of ex post facto laws. (Id. at 358–67). In 2009, Collins was convicted of first-degree sexual assault and was sentenced to 25 years with five years suspended and 15 years of probation. (Id. at 351–53). Although his sentence was at the lower end of the presumptive range established for his offense by the Alaska Legislature’s 2006 amendments to the state sentencing guidelines, Collins moved for his case to be referred by a three-judge sentencing panel. (Id. at 352–53). After the sentencing judge denied Collins’ motion, the Court of Appeals of Alaska later remanded his sentence back to the superior court to reconsider Collins’ motion to be heard by the three-judge sentencing panel. (Id.). While the Supreme Court of Alaska considered the State’s petition on this matter (Collins I), the Alaska Legislature amended the governing statute for three-judge sentence panel referrals in 2013 (Id. at 354). The legislature specifically noted its intent to overturn the decision in Collins I, reasoning that the legislature did not intend when crafting the original statute for defendants convicted of a sexual felony, like Collins had, to be able to obtain referral to a three-judge panel. (Id.). When the superior court applied the 2013 amendments on remand in Collins I, the court again declined to refer Collins’ case to the three-judge panel, which the Court of Appeals of Alaska later affirmed (Collins II). (Id. at 355). The Supreme Court of Alaska reversed, holding that the lower courts should have evaluated Collins’ case under Collins I, rather than Collins II. (Id. at 359). The Court reasoned that subjecting Collins to the 2013 three-judge panel standards of Collins II would run afoul of the separation of powers and allow the legislature to institute ex post facto laws. (Id. at 359–60). The Court further reasoned if the 2013 amendments are substantiative and not merely procedural, then applying the 2013 amendments would deprive the appeals court in Collins I of the finality and stare decisis power that state law guarantees under Alaska Statute 22.07.020(g) for substantiative laws. (Id. at 362). Accordingly, the Court reversed Collins II and remanded Collins’ case back to the court of appeals to determine whether the 2013 amendments are substantiative or procedural, instructing that a finding of the former prohibits the amendments from being applied retroactively to Collins’ case. (Id. at 358–67).

Collins v. State

CRIMINAL LAW
Supreme Court of Alaska (2025)
Katharine Roberts

In Collins v. State, 568 P.3d 349 (Alaska 2025), the Supreme Court of Alaska held that the Court of Appeals of Alaska erred by retroactively applying new standards dictating whether a criminal defendant’s case can be heard by a three-judge sentencing panel, violating the separation of powers doctrine and the prohibition of ex post facto laws. (Id. at 358–67). In 2009, Collins was convicted of first-degree sexual assault and was sentenced to 25 years with five years suspended and 15 years of probation. (Id. at 351–53). Although his sentence was at the lower end of the presumptive range established for his offense by the Alaska Legislature’s 2006 amendments to the state sentencing guidelines, Collins moved for his case to be referred by a three-judge sentencing panel. (Id. at 352–53). After the sentencing judge denied Collins’ motion, the Court of Appeals of Alaska later remanded his sentence back to the superior court to reconsider Collins’ motion to be heard by the three-judge sentencing panel. (Id.). While the Supreme Court of Alaska considered the State’s petition on this matter (Collins I), the Alaska Legislature amended the governing statute for three-judge sentence panel referrals in 2013 (Id. at 354). The legislature specifically noted its intent to overturn the decision in Collins I, reasoning that the legislature did not intend when crafting the original statute for defendants convicted of a sexual felony, like Collins had, to be able to obtain referral to a three-judge panel. (Id.). When the superior court applied the 2013 amendments on remand in Collins I, the court again declined to refer Collins’ case to the three-judge panel, which the Court of Appeals of Alaska later affirmed (Collins II). (Id. at 355). The Supreme Court of Alaska reversed, holding that the lower courts should have evaluated Collins’ case under Collins I, rather than Collins II. (Id. at 359). The Court reasoned that subjecting Collins to the 2013 three-judge panel standards of Collins II would run afoul of the separation of powers and allow the legislature to institute ex post facto laws. (Id. at 359–60). The Court further reasoned if the 2013 amendments are substantiative and not merely procedural, then applying the 2013 amendments would deprive the appeals court in Collins I of the finality and stare decisis power that state law guarantees under Alaska Statute 22.07.020(g) for substantiative laws. (Id. at 362). Accordingly, the Court reversed Collins II and remanded Collins’ case back to the court of appeals to determine whether the 2013 amendments are substantiative or procedural, instructing that a finding of the former prohibits the amendments from being applied retroactively to Collins’ case. (Id. at 358–67).