FAMILY LAW
Supreme Court of Alaska (2025)
Suleyman Amjad
In Matter of Macon J., 565 P.3d 215, 226 (Alaska 2025), the Supreme Court of Alaska held that appointing a guardian does not require the same standard of evidence as terminating parental rights and that such appointment is not a de facto termination of parental rights. (Id. at 226). Macon is a child in the foster care system in Alaska. (Id. at 218.) His father, Kaleb, left him and his mother when Macon was six years old to live in Arizona. (Id.). When Macon was eight, the Office of Childcare Services (OCS) took custody of Macon and initiated a Child in Need of Aid (CINA) proceeding due to reports of drug use and domestic violence. (Id.). While a CINA proceeding typically requires that both parents be contacted, Kaleb alleges that he was not informed. (Id.). After Kaleb expressed interest in asserting full custody of Macon, OCS performed a home study, which led to a negative recommendation. (Id. at 219). After a year in the foster system, Macon settled with his aunt Kara. (Id.). After two years, Kara filed for guardianship of Macon. Kaleb contested the guardianship motion, but Kara succeeded. (Id.). Kaleb appealed. (Id.). Kaleb argued that a proceeding granting guardianship is functionally equivalent to a termination of parental rights and, therefore, should require the same standard of evidence present in a termination proceeding. (Id. at 218). The Court rejected Kaleb’s argument, because granting guardianship to a third party does not terminate the rights of a parent. (Id. at 222). Kaleb also claimed that granting guardianship is a de facto termination of his parental rights because it is virtually impossible for a parent to reacquire custody rights so long as the guardian is providing adequate care. (Id. at 225). The Court clarified a previous holding, stating that any material change to the lives of the child, the guardian, or the parent could warrant a change in custody under Alaskan law. (Id.). Affirming the lower court’s decision, the Supreme Court held that appointing a guardian does not require the same standard of evidence as terminating parental rights and that such appointment was not a de facto termination of parental rights. (Id. at 226).
