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Matter of Tonja P.

HEALTH LAW
Supreme Court of Alaska (2023)
Steve Stenquist

In Matter of Tonja P., 524 P.3d 795 (Alaska 2023), the supreme court ruled that involuntary commitment is proper where a court determines that commitment is the least restrictive possible treatment measure, and that an order to medicate the patient is proper where the side effects have been considered, the patient is unable to make a decision for themselves, and the patient has no advanced directive. (Id. at 800–02). Tonja P. suffered from schizophrenia, and her condition had worsened when she stopped taking her medications. (Id. at 797). Tonja P. was brought to the Alaska Institute (API), and a doctor found that she was unable to make decisions for herself and that she needed medication for which she had a low probability of experiencing side effects, while a court visitor found that she had no advanced directive and her father was unreachable (Id. at 798–99). Based these findings, the superior court ordered involuntary commitment and an order to medicate Tonja P. (Id.). Tonja P. appealed these orders to the supreme court, arguing that the lower court erred in finding that commitment to API was the least restrictive available form of treatment, that the court visitor’s report was cursory, and that the court failed to make the necessary findings to show that medication was necessary. (Id. at 800). The supreme court held that the concern that Tonja P.’s medication could only be administered in API was enough to make commitment the least restrictive treatment possibility and that the court’s consideration of the benefits of medication as well as the side effects was enough to show that medication was necessary. (Id. at 801) It also ruled that the court visitor’s attempts to contact Tonja P.’s father as well as her discovery that Tonja P. did not have an advanced directive were enough to make her investigation into whether Tonja P. would have objected to medication sufficient. (Id.). Thus, involuntary commitment is proper where a court determines that commitment is the least restrictive possible treatment, and that an order to medicate the patient is proper where the side effects have been considered, the patient is unable to make a decision for themselves, and the patient has no advanced directive. (Id. at 800–02).

Matter of Tonja P.

HEALTH LAW
Supreme Court of Alaska (2023)
Steve Stenquist

In Matter of Tonja P., 524 P.3d 795 (Alaska 2023), the supreme court ruled that involuntary commitment is proper where a court determines that commitment is the least restrictive possible treatment measure, and that an order to medicate the patient is proper where the side effects have been considered, the patient is unable to make a decision for themselves, and the patient has no advanced directive. (Id. at 800–02). Tonja P. suffered from schizophrenia, and her condition had worsened when she stopped taking her medications. (Id. at 797). Tonja P. was brought to the Alaska Institute (API), and a doctor found that she was unable to make decisions for herself and that she needed medication for which she had a low probability of experiencing side effects, while a court visitor found that she had no advanced directive and her father was unreachable (Id. at 798–99). Based these findings, the superior court ordered involuntary commitment and an order to medicate Tonja P. (Id.). Tonja P. appealed these orders to the supreme court, arguing that the lower court erred in finding that commitment to API was the least restrictive available form of treatment, that the court visitor’s report was cursory, and that the court failed to make the necessary findings to show that medication was necessary. (Id. at 800). The supreme court held that the concern that Tonja P.’s medication could only be administered in API was enough to make commitment the least restrictive treatment possibility and that the court’s consideration of the benefits of medication as well as the side effects was enough to show that medication was necessary. (Id. at 801) It also ruled that the court visitor’s attempts to contact Tonja P.’s father as well as her discovery that Tonja P. did not have an advanced directive were enough to make her investigation into whether Tonja P. would have objected to medication sufficient. (Id.). Thus, involuntary commitment is proper where a court determines that commitment is the least restrictive possible treatment, and that an order to medicate the patient is proper where the side effects have been considered, the patient is unable to make a decision for themselves, and the patient has no advanced directive. (Id. at 800–02).