CRIMINAL LAW
Court of Appeals of Alaska (2025)
James Blair
In Burney v. State, 563 P.3d 86 (Alaska Ct. App. 2025), the Court of Appeals of Alaska held that the trial court’s determination that a jury tampering incident was not presumptively prejudicial was error, because the trial court framed the incident from the perspective of an objective observer, rather than from the viewpoint of how the juror understood the incident. (Id. at 107). Criminal defendants convicted of murder motioned for a new trial after a juror informed the trial judge about an incident of jury tampering. (Id. at 103–04). The juror told the judge that a man, whom he believed to be one of the defendant’s brothers, came up to him and flashed his waistband. (Id. at 104). The juror believed that the man was attempting to show he had a gun, and the juror testified that he was worried that he did have a gun. (Id.). The juror testified that he believed the man was trying to intimidate him. (Id.). The trial court denied the defendants’ motion, reasoning that the incident was too brief, and the objective evidence of what happened—whether the man did have a gun, what the man’s intentions were—was so unclear that a presumption of prejudice did not attach to the incident. (Id. at 105). The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the trial court had misconstrued the inquiry into whether an objective juror would have been influenced. (Id. at 107). Though the trial court must ascertain how an objective juror would have been affected by the incident, the incident must be framed with the facts as the juror subjectively understood them. (Id.). The juror believed that a defendant’s brother had tried to intimidate him, and he was worried he had a gun. (Id. at 103–04). Thus, the Court of Appeals of Alaska found that an objective juror, believing that the defendant’s brother had threatened him, would create a credible risk of influence, and consequently a presumption of prejudice attached. (Id. at 108).
