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Stoneking v. State

CRIMINAL LAW
Court of Appeals of Alaska (2025)
Katharine Roberts

In Stoneking v. State, 567 P.3d 725 (Alaska Ct. App. 2025), the Court of Appeals of Alaska held that the Alaska Parole Board may not deny a defendant’s application for discretionary parole because it deems the defendant’s conviction a serious crime or based on the board members’ personal opinions regarding what an appropriate sentence for the defendant’s crime should be. (Id. at 729). Stoneking was sentenced to serve 99 years in prison for first-degree murder, first-degree assault, and first-degree burglary. (Id.). When Stoneking’s application for parole was reviewed in 2019, the Parole Board denied discretionary parole and required that he serve ten more years before applying again. (Id.). Stoneking challenged the Parole Board’s decision, and after both parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, the superior court denied the application. (Id.). On appeal, Stoneking argued that the Parole Board misapplied AS 33.16.100(a)(4), a statutory provision that prescribes the parameters the Board must follow when making discretionary parole decisions. (Id.). Among other things, the provision authorizes the Board to deny discretionary parole to a defendant if it believes that releasing that defendant would “engender disrespect for the law or would be incompatible with societal norms.” (Id. at 729–30). When Stoneking applied for discretionary review in 2019, seven victims of his crimes wrote letters to the Parole Board detailing their strong opposition to him being granted parole based on the ongoing effects his conduct has had on their lives. (Id. at 731). Stoneking’s parole officer also recommended his application be denied, despite the rehabilitation and education programs Stoneking participated in while incarcerated, because of the violence of his crimes and his inability to grasp the seriousness of his murder conviction. (Id.). The Court of Appeals of Alaska upheld the Parole Board’s and the superior court’s decision to deny Stoneking’s parole, arguing in part that AS 33.16.100(a) permits the Board to discretionarily deny a defendant’s application even if they meet the other eligibility criteria. (Id. at 732). Additionally, 22 Alaska Administrative Code 20.165 gives the Parole Board the discretion to “determine the priority and weight to be given each factor when making a parole release decision.” (Id.). The Parole Board also satisfied Stoneking’s procedural rights as outlined in AS 33.16.130(b), including by giving Stoneking a letter in writing that explained its reasoning for denying his parole application. (Id. at 733). Although the Court of Appeals of Alaska agreed with Stoneking’s arguments that the Board should not have considered whether his sentence was sufficient for his conviction, the record indicated that the Board appropriately referenced specific facts and circumstances of Stoneking’s crime and behavior when it denied his parole application. (Id. at 738). Accordingly, the Board made individualized findings that were supported by the factual record in denying Stoneking’s parole application, rather than making a categorical determination as Stoneking alleged based on the seriousness of his offense. (Id. at 738–39). As such, the Court of Appeals  of Alaska affirmed the superior court’s denial of Stoneking’s parole application, holding that although the Board did not abuse its discretion, Alaska law does not permit the Alaska Parole Board to deny a defendant’s application for discretionary parole because it deems the defendant’s conviction a serious crime or based on the board members’ personal opinions regarding what an appropriate sentence for the defendant’s crime should be.

Stoneking v. State

CRIMINAL LAW
Court of Appeals of Alaska (2025)
Katharine Roberts

In Stoneking v. State, 567 P.3d 725 (Alaska Ct. App. 2025), the Court of Appeals of Alaska held that the Alaska Parole Board may not deny a defendant’s application for discretionary parole because it deems the defendant’s conviction a serious crime or based on the board members’ personal opinions regarding what an appropriate sentence for the defendant’s crime should be. (Id. at 729). Stoneking was sentenced to serve 99 years in prison for first-degree murder, first-degree assault, and first-degree burglary. (Id.). When Stoneking’s application for parole was reviewed in 2019, the Parole Board denied discretionary parole and required that he serve ten more years before applying again. (Id.). Stoneking challenged the Parole Board’s decision, and after both parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, the superior court denied the application. (Id.). On appeal, Stoneking argued that the Parole Board misapplied AS 33.16.100(a)(4), a statutory provision that prescribes the parameters the Board must follow when making discretionary parole decisions. (Id.). Among other things, the provision authorizes the Board to deny discretionary parole to a defendant if it believes that releasing that defendant would “engender disrespect for the law or would be incompatible with societal norms.” (Id. at 729–30). When Stoneking applied for discretionary review in 2019, seven victims of his crimes wrote letters to the Parole Board detailing their strong opposition to him being granted parole based on the ongoing effects his conduct has had on their lives. (Id. at 731). Stoneking’s parole officer also recommended his application be denied, despite the rehabilitation and education programs Stoneking participated in while incarcerated, because of the violence of his crimes and his inability to grasp the seriousness of his murder conviction. (Id.). The Court of Appeals of Alaska upheld the Parole Board’s and the superior court’s decision to deny Stoneking’s parole, arguing in part that AS 33.16.100(a) permits the Board to discretionarily deny a defendant’s application even if they meet the other eligibility criteria. (Id. at 732). Additionally, 22 Alaska Administrative Code 20.165 gives the Parole Board the discretion to “determine the priority and weight to be given each factor when making a parole release decision.” (Id.). The Parole Board also satisfied Stoneking’s procedural rights as outlined in AS 33.16.130(b), including by giving Stoneking a letter in writing that explained its reasoning for denying his parole application. (Id. at 733). Although the Court of Appeals of Alaska agreed with Stoneking’s arguments that the Board should not have considered whether his sentence was sufficient for his conviction, the record indicated that the Board appropriately referenced specific facts and circumstances of Stoneking’s crime and behavior when it denied his parole application. (Id. at 738). Accordingly, the Board made individualized findings that were supported by the factual record in denying Stoneking’s parole application, rather than making a categorical determination as Stoneking alleged based on the seriousness of his offense. (Id. at 738–39). As such, the Court of Appeals  of Alaska affirmed the superior court’s denial of Stoneking’s parole application, holding that although the Board did not abuse its discretion, Alaska law does not permit the Alaska Parole Board to deny a defendant’s application for discretionary parole because it deems the defendant’s conviction a serious crime or based on the board members’ personal opinions regarding what an appropriate sentence for the defendant’s crime should be.