CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Court of Appeals of Alaska (2025)
Tommy Nowak
In Lookhart v. State, 570 P.3d 949 (Alaska Ct. App. 2025), the Court of Appeals of Alaska held that a search warrant giving officers the right to seize dental and healthcare records, computers and any “removable or loose computer storage media such as … cell phones” was not sufficient to authorize a search of all electronic data on a personal cell phone. (Id. at 954–56). Lookhart and Cranford operated a dental practice that was suspected of providing unnecessary medical procedures to Medicaid patients to increase profits. (Id. at 952). The Alaska Medicaid Fraud Control Unit received tips about these practices and obtained a search warrant. (Id. at 952–53). Investigators seized Lookhart and Cranford’s cell phones and extracted the phones’ data, finding incriminating text messages, videos, and photos. (Id. at 956). Cranford later entered into a plea agreement consenting to the search of her cell phone, but this occurred after the initial searches had taken place. (Id. at 952). Lookhart challenged the constitutionality of the phone searches, arguing that they did not comply with the (1) probable cause and (2) particularity requirements of the Fourth Amendment and Article 1, Section 14 of the Alaska Constitution. (Id. at 954). The trial court held that because there was probable cause to search the dental business’s computers, there was also probable cause to search Cranford and Lookhart’s cell phones because “modern day cellphones are computer devices.” (Id. at 953). Furthermore, the allegation that Cranford and Lookhart were co-conspirators led to the inference that they had communicated to each other about their conspiracy using cell phones. (Id.). The Court of Appeals of Alaska rejected both probable cause arguments because the affidavit for the warrant did not explain why law enforcement expected to find evidence of crime in the cell phones. (Id. at 957). The court also noted that cell phones serve different functions and contain different information than computers. (Id. at 958). The trial court argued the warrant was particular because it “identified the types of records sought.” (Id. at 959). The court of appeals disagreed, because the warrant did not describe the particular place to be searched on the phones. (Id.). Reversing the trial court decision, the Court of Appeals of Alaska held the “unfettered” search of Lookhart’s cell phone violated the probable cause and particularity requirements of the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 14 of the Alaska Constitution. (Id. at 961). Because Cranford pled guilty and consented to the search of her cellphone, which contained evidence incriminating Lookhart, the court of appeals remanded to the trial court the issue of determining whether evidence on her phone could be excluded or not, as Lookhart’s standing to challenge that issue was unclear. (Id. at 964).
